3 Presentations

• 
  04:00 PM - 04:30 PM

  An Empirical Differential Game for Sustainable Forest Management

  • Pablo Andrés-Domenech, presenter, GERAD
  • Guiomar Martín-Herrán, GERAD - Universidad de Valladolid
  • Georges Zaccour, Chair in Game Theory and Management, GERAD and HEC Montréal

  We model the role of the world's forests as a major carbon sink and consider the impact that forest depletion has on the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Two types of agents are considered: forest owners who exploit the forest and draw economic revenues in the form of timber and agricultural use of deforested land; and a non-forest-owner group who pollutes and suffers the negative externality of having a decreasing forest stock. We retrieve the cooperative solution for this game and show the cases in which cooperation enables a partial reduction in the negative externality. We analyze when it is jointly profitable to abate emissions, when it is profitable to reduce net deforestation, and when it is optimal to do both (abate and reduce net deforestation). It is shown how the cooperative solution can be sustained by means of a time-consistent payment mechanism.

• 
  04:30 PM - 05:00 PM

  Open Access to the Resource of Antibiotic Treatment Efficacy Subject to Bacterial Resistance

  • Bruno Nkuiya, presenter, Université Laval and CREATE
  • Markus Herrmann, Université Laval and CREATE

  In this paper, we are interested in how a pharmaceutical industry manages existing antibiotic drugs in the context of bacterial resistance. We consider a model based on an epidemiological framework where antibiotic recovery rates, and thus intrinsic qualities, may differ. Antibiotic efficacy is modeled as a common pool of a non-renewable resource to which antibiotic producers have open access. The paper derives antibiotic demands within a vertical differentiation model and characterizes the dynamics of infected individuals, antibiotic efficacy and treatment rates under the open-access and the socially optimal allocation. We show that the high-quality antibiotic drug loses its comparative advantage over time under both allocations, such that the low-quality drug should be used longer. This occurs at a later point of time in the social optimum and allows for a better control of infection in the longer run. In contrast with the ambiguous outcome reported in the literature, the socially optimal steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy is lower than that of the open-access allocation. We also extend our analysis to a strategic, duopolistic context.

• 
  05:00 PM - 05:30 PM

  An Online Game for Collaborative Logistics

  • Mikael Rönnqvist, presenter, Université Laval
  • Sophie D'Amours, Université Laval
  • Philippe Marier, Université Laval

  We describe an online educational game in collaborative logistics. The game is based on an award-winning application in cost allocation in transportation. The purpose of the game is to acquire an understanding of negotiation, coalition building and cost/profit sharing when the players have different powers and hold different levels of information. The game is played with each player representing a single company. The challenge for the players is to find an efficient coalition and to share the benefits and costs of the collaboration. There is both a paper and now an online version of the game. We describe the underlying case study, game set up, analysis tools and experiences for running the game in several countries.