3 Presentations

• 
  02:00 PM - 02:30 PM

  S-adapted Equilibria in Games Played Over Event Trees with Coupled Constraint

  • Elnaz Kanani Kuchesfehani, presenter, HEC Montréal

  This article deals with the general theory of games that are played over uncontrolled event trees, i.e., games where the transition from one node to another is nature’s decision and cannot be influenced by the players’ actions. The solution concept for this class of games was introduced under the name of S-adapted equilibrium where S stands for sample of realizations of the random process. In this paper, it is assumed that the players also face a coupled constraint at each node. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by Rosen is used to solve the problem. Necessary conditions for optimality of the normalized S-adapted equilibrium are presented and the problem is solved through introducing the penalty tax rates for the violation of the coupled constraint. Furthermore, a simple illustrative example in environmental economics is presented for more elaboration.

• 
  02:30 PM - 03:00 PM

  Fighting Corruption: To Precommit or Not?

  • Fabien Ngendakuriyo, presenter, GERAD
  • Georges Zaccour, Chair in Game Theory and Management, GERAD and HEC Montréal

  We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting to fight corruption.

• 
  03:00 PM - 03:30 PM

  Non-Linear Strategies in Differential Games: A Numerical Investigation

  • Javier de Frutos, presenter, GERAD - Universidad de Valladolid
  • Guiomar Martín-Herrán, GERAD - Universidad de Valladolid

  Differential games
  have been extensively employed to model economic problems in an
  ever growing number of areas including industrial organization,
  marketing, macroeconomic policy or environmental management problems
  among others. The choice of type of model is frequently driven by
  the tractability problem which, usually, forces the model to belong
  to the class of linear-state or linear-quadratic differential games.
  However, considering models with a more general non-linearity can
  lead, in some situations, to meaningful, richer conclusions
  extending their applicability. Numerical methods are a powerful tool
  to investigate non-linear differential games.