3 présentations

• 
  10h30 - 10h55

  A bilevel approach for demand side management in the energy field

  • Luce Brotcorne, prés., INRIA Lille
  • Léonard Von Niederhausern, INRIA

  Pricing models for demand side management methods are traditionally used to control electricity demand which became quite irregular recently and resulted in inefficiency in supply. In this work, we propose bilevel pricing models to explore the relationship between energy suppliers and customers who are connected to a smart grid. The smart grid technology allows customers to keep track of hourly prices and shift their demand accordingly, and allows the provider to observe the actual demand response to its pricing strategy. Moreover, we assume that the smart grid optimizes the usage of a renewable energy generation source and a storage capacity.

• 
  10h55 - 11h20

  A bilevel modelling approach to service network design and pricing: Application to intermodal transportation

  • Christine Tawfik, prés., University of Liege (ULg)
  • Sabine Limbourg, HEC-ULg

  A bilevel model is proposed to jointly tackle the problems of designing intermodal freight services and determining their associated prices. At the upper level, an intermodal operator seeks profit maximization, while at the lower level, the shipper minimize their logistics costs by dividing their demands between the learder’s itineraries and an all-road alternative. Frequently delay constraints are considered as well, in order to capture the impact of the service reliability on the currently challenged intermodal market penetration. Finally, we integrate discrete choice analysis in the expression of the lower level in an innovative approach to depict real life.

• 
  11h20 - 11h45

  A Stackelberg game model for supplying electricity to consumers

  • Olivier Beaude, EDF – R&D

  To imagine the future of electricity provider offers, a Stackelberg game between providers and consumers is considered, under a standard bilevel form. At the upper level, providers maximize their profit, which is directly dependent on the providers choices of the consumers. At the lower level, consumers compare their bill with the different providers; they choose the provider with the smallest associated bill. Three different consumer classes are considered, namely non-flexible, flexible, and flexible with renewable generation and storage capacity. This model is studied theoretically – using strong links with routing games and bilevel problems - and numerically on French realistic data.