Journées de l'optimisation 2016

HEC Montréal, Québec, Canada, 2 — 4 mai 2016

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TBP Séance plénière IV / Plenary Session IV

3 mai 2016 14h00 – 15h00

Salle: Amphithéâtre Banque Nationale

Présidée par Georges Zaccour

1 présentation

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    14h00 - 15h00

    The design of incentive mechanisms through statistical machine learning

    • David C. Parkes, prés., Harvard University

    Mechanism design studies situations where a set of agents each hold private information regarding their preferences over different outcomes. A mechanism receives claims about preferences and chooses an outcome and payments. In this talk, I draw a connection between the discriminant functions of multi-class classifiers and incentive-compatible mechanism design, enabling new applications of optimization for the design of mechanisms in settings both with and without money, including auctions, assignment and matching.

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