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HEC Montréal, Canada, May 6 - 8, 2013

2013 Optimization Days

HEC Montréal, Canada, 6 — 8 May 2013

Schedule Authors My Schedule

TB6 Théories des jeux II / Game Theory II

May 7, 2013 03:30 PM – 05:10 PM

Location: Mary Husny

Chaired by Jesus Marin-Solano

3 Presentations

  • 03:30 PM - 03:55 PM

    Auto Manufacturer’s Green Strategy Choice in Presence of Rivals

    • Samira Keivanpour, presenter, Université Laval
    • Daoud Aït-Kadi, Université Laval
    • Christian Mascle, École Polytechnique de Montréal

    An extended form of evolutionary game theory for modeling the game between automakers in complying with End-of-life (EOL) vehicles legislations is proposed. The introduced model analyzes the strategic choice of auto manufacturers in response to EOL vehicles directives as the result of interaction of competitors in the market.

  • 03:55 PM - 04:20 PM

    Optimization Models for Cost Allocation and Coalition Structure

    • Mario Guajardo, presenter, NHH Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
    • Mikael Rönnqvist, Université Laval

    Given a set of players and the cost of each coalition, we formulate mixed integer programming models to determine coalition structure and cost allocations. We consider core stability conditions and others such as maximum size constraints and strong stability. We illustrate our approach in problems in forest and petroleum industries.

  • 04:20 PM - 04:45 PM

    On the Sustainability of Cooperation in a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players and Time Inconsistent Preferences

    • Jesus Marin-Solano, presenter, Universitat de Barcelona

    The problem of finding time-consistent equilibria in a differential game with asymmetric players is studied. Players in the model discount the future at different (nonconstant) discount rates of time preference. The issue of the dynamic consistency of the grand coalition (sustainability of cooperation) is addressed. Results are illustrated with a simple example.

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