2016 Optimization Days

HEC Montréal, Québec, Canada, May 2 — 4, 2016

Schedule Authors My Schedule
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TBP Séance plénière IV / Plenary Session IV

May 3, 2016 02:00 PM – 03:00 PM

Location: Amphithéâtre Banque Nationale

Chaired by Georges Zaccour

1 Presentation

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    02:00 PM - 03:00 PM

    The design of incentive mechanisms through statistical machine learning

    • David C. Parkes, presenter, Harvard University

    Mechanism design studies situations where a set of agents each hold private information regarding their preferences over different outcomes. A mechanism receives claims about preferences and chooses an outcome and payments. In this talk, I draw a connection between the discriminant functions of multi-class classifiers and incentive-compatible mechanism design, enabling new applications of optimization for the design of mechanisms in settings both with and without money, including auctions, assignment and matching.

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